Don't Throw Money at Africa by Killick, Tony
It is so exhilarating, is it not, such a great change.
Here we have the two politically most important
people in Britain arguing the case for amassive new
aid effort – a doubling – to overcome poverty in
Africa; backing this with major increases in the
government’s own aid budget; committing to the
0.7 per cent target; pushing the G8 leaders (and
soon the EuropeanUnion) to follow their lead.And
that is without mentioning Sachs, Bono, Geldof,
the Africa Commission, Mandela, Annan…
Not only that, but the problems that they are
addressing are manifestly real; the poverty and
suffering so widespread and acute. If we take a broad
geographical sweep, Africa1 is the last big
development challenge, the region left behind. It
is a problem none of us would want to ignore;
according to PrimeMinister Blair it is ‘a scar on the
conscience of the world’.
But are we not in danger of getting carried away
by the excitement of the moment; of forgetting a
lot of the lessons that we thought until recently we
had learned about the nature of Africa’s problems
and the difficulties of using aid to solve them?That,
at least, is the premise of this article. It does not
question the gravity ofAfrica’s problems, although
it is concerned by the tendency to exaggerate and
over-generalise. There is, in fact, a wide variety of
experiences on the continent. Overall, economic
growth is at 4–5 per cent and is expected to speed
up in 2005. A good many countries are lagging
badly behind but in 2001–02 (the latest available
year), 25African countries raised per capita incomes,
against only nine, with zero or negative growth.
Some have been doing well on social indicators too.
So while the problems are very real, there are no
grounds for excessive pessimism, or despair at past
efforts. The big question is, how much of a
contribution to the remaining problems would be
made by large-scale additions to aid flows?
I want to suggest that the results are likely to be
disappointing at best, and at worst counter-
productive, for two related reasons: (1) large further
increases in Africa’s dependence on aid are apt to
have seriously negative effects within the continent,
and (2) an overriding emphasis on raising the
quantity of aid will inevitably conflict with the efforts
over the past two decades to raise the quality, or
effectiveness, of this assistance.
1 The dangers of excessive
dependence
The starting point here is to note Africa’s already
heavy reliance on aid.Over the years, with a dip in
the 1990s, Africa’s share of total development
assistance has risen markedly, doubling between
the early 1970s and today. It has again begun rising
sharply and seems destined to continue to do so.
As of 2002 (the latest available year), aid to Africa,
relative to population and various economic
magnitudes, exceeded that to the other two main
developing regions by multiples of between 3 and
21, depending on the comparison in question. The
figures inTable 1 show the factors by which various
measures of aid toAfrica exceed that to other regions
(e.g. aid toAfrica as a share of national income was
6.5 times greater than in the case of South Asia).
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Table 1: African Aid Comparisons
South Asia (%) Latin America and the Caribbean (%)
Aid/national income 6.5 21
Aid per capita 5.5 3
Aid/capital formation 6.5 20
Aid/imports 3 14
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This relative concentration has resulted in already
high levels of aid dependency, by the conventional
indicators used to illustrate this. The following
statistics show average dependency for the top 50
per cent of African recipient countries, as of 2002.
The purpose of concentrating on the top half of
recipients is to screen out countries that have
“graduated” (e.g. SouthAfrica, Botswana), or have
put themselves beyond the pale (e.g. Zimbabwe,
and to a considerable extent Nigeria), or are so
much in the throes of turmoil as to preclude
substantial aid inflows (e.g. Somalia, Democratic
Republic of theCongo).Although this is a floating
population at the edges, it is to the top 50 per cent
that a large part of the doubling of aid to Africa
which is being called for, by for example theAfrica
Commission, would be directed.
Something to bear in mind about the figures in
Table 2 is that they are underestimates of the
present-day situation, because aid to Africa has
been rising fast in the most recent years – much
faster than the economic variables used in the
denominators. So aid dependence is already high,
by any reasonable standards. From this viewpoint,
the donor countries could not be accused of
meanness. The question which arises is whether a
near-doubling of these ratios would be desirable.
Some reasons for this question are dealt with below.
2 Diminishing returns
One of the more robust findings of the empirical
literature on the aid-growth connection is that,
beyond a certain point, usually measured relative
toGDP, diminishing returns set in: the contribution
to growth of further increments of aid begins to tail
off and eventually becomes negative. Where the
turning point lies varies widely from one estimate
to the next,mostly in the range of 15–45 per cent
of GDP. Looking at the existing ratios, it seems
inevitable that a doubling of aid would place a high
proportion ofAfrican recipients at risk of seriously
diminishing returns. Moreover, there are reasons
for fearing that the empirical literature cited here
understates the problem.
1. The estimates cited are drawn from cross-country
regressions based on samples of developing
countries from all regions. I am not aware of
estimates confined only to African recipients.
My hypothesis wouldbe that diminishing returns
set in at an earlier stage in the generality ofAfrican
economies because of weaker institutions and
larger scarcities of human capital.
2. The concept of diminishing returns is an
incremental one. It asks about theproductivity of
marginal additions of aid (or other inputs).
Estimates donot, therefore,provide a reliable guide
to the likely consequences of non-incremental
changes, like the “doubling”presently being urged.
Here again, my hypothesis would be that the
problems of diminishing returns wouldbebigger
in the event of large, quite rapid, discontinuous
increases, as now being contemplated.
3. I suspect that these empirical estimates are not
good at picking up the longer-termeffects of aid
dependence on institutional development, to
be described shortly.
4. The current donor environment, with all of its
stress on the reduction of poverty and
achievement of the MDGs, is having the effect
of channelling large proportions of aid into social
spending. While the reasoning behind this is
understandable and while by no means all of
these expenditures should be thought of as
“consumption”, nonetheless the contemporary
bias away from the use of aid for the economic
sectors and to promote increased production
must tend to reduce the extent to which aid is
productive in the conventional sense.
Diminishing returns, therefore, are apt to be a
serious consequence of large increases in aid to
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Table 2: Aid Dependency Ratios for the Top-
half of African Recipients, 2002
Net aid as a percentage of: (%)
Gross national income
Mean 23
Median 17
Gross domestic capital formation
Mean 137
Median 108
Imports
Mean 56
Median 49
Source: Calculated from World Bank, World
Development Indicators, 2004.
Africa, with the implication that the assistancemay
do much less good than is currently being argued
by its proponents.
3 Absorptive capacity
By common consent, absorptive capacity – the
ability to put aid to effective use – is severely
constrained inmost African countries. This is why
diminishing returns occur. Absorptive capacity is
essentially a function of two things: the availability
of human skills and the institutional settings in
which people work. The problem is compounded
in Africa by the large-scale brain drain, as scarce
skilled workers go abroad in search of better
earnings and living standards. It is compounded
too by the high morbidity and mortality rates in
Africa, of which the HIV/AIDS pandemicmerits a
special mention.
The fact is that we are contemplating large
increases in financial assistance to Africa in the
context of severe and worsening shortages of the
human skills needed to put themoney to good use
– in health, in education and in other fields. It is
more difficult to generalise about the institutional
aspect of the absorptive capacity nexus but the
situation can perhaps be illustrated by reference to
some donors’ attempts to place increasing
proportions of their assistance through recipient
governments’ own budgetary systems – direct
budgetary support (DBS). It is well known that
donors like the Department for International
Development (DFID) are very concerned about the
problem of “fiduciary risk” associated with DBS –
the risk that, as a result of fungibility and weak
budgetary systems, aid monies will not reach their
intended beneficiaries. The present writer recently
undertook a study of this problem in Ghana – an
African country generally regarded as offering a
good environment for effective aid – and found a
horrendously weak budgetary system that was
entirely incapable of providing reasonable
safeguards against fiduciary risk. Or consider a
more favourable case, Tanzania – rightly regarded
as one of themost satisfactory countries for donors
to deal with.A recent study ofDBS to that country,
while arriving at favourable conclusions overall,
nevertheless doubted its effects on poverty
reduction, found that budget systems and
accountability remained weak and cautioned about
the limited contribution that external assistance
could make, with domestic political commitment
the key ingredient. Such results, and the many
leakages out of the system, help explain the rather
common finding of only weak correlations, or none,
between spending on health and education and
outcome indicators.
I shall suggest later that heavy aid dependence
can itself contribute to weak institutional
development, andhence to poor absorptive capacity.
Of course, wemust beware of over-generalisation.
There are many well-functioning institutions that
are able to harness the abilities of their workers.
But equally, many are not in that situation.
Continuing widespread problems with the
enforcement of property rights and with the rule
of law, attest to this and contribute to it.
Even if absorptive capacities are low, this does
not mean that donors should wait passively until
they improve. A twin-track approach is needed,
simultaneously to build capacities and to support
these with finance. But one of the lessons of the
past, which we are in danger of glossing over, is
that donors have not been very good at capacity
development.As a result,much of the huge amounts
ofmoney that have gone into “technical assistance”
to Africa are widely accepted, even by donors, as
having been ineffectual at best. The fact is that
capacity development is the result of complex
processes, in which outsiders have few comparative
advantages.Thus, the interim results of an ongoing
study of this by the European Centre for
Development Policy Management emphasises the
dominant influences of domestic political and
governance structures, and of the quality of local
leadership involved in efforts to raise institutional
capabilities. While they did not rule out the
possibility of useful contributions from outside,
the most crucial ingredients were home grown –
and were complex. This is not territory in which
we can assume that official donors can move
effectively and quickly to raise capabilities and
absorptive capacities. In the context of the aid-
doubling campaign, we must be beware of
resounding assertions that donors will work with
African governments to break capacity bottlenecks.
The concern raised here can be restated as drawing
attention to the difficulties of sustaining short-term,
donor-driven initiatives into the longer term,
because of institutional weaknesses and shortages
of needed skills.
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4 Macroeconomic problems
Heavy aid dependency brings macroeconomic
problems, of which two can be mentioned here.
First, there is the “Dutch disease” phenomenon,
referring to the possibility that large windfall receipts
of foreign exchange (in the formof aid, in this case)
result in uncompetitive exchange rates, which
undermine export performance and thus tend to
perpetuate aid dependence. This is admittedly a
complicated subject. Themere occurrence of large
new aid inflows is not in itself sufficient to indicate
the existence of a “Dutch disease” problem; it all
depends on how the money is used and how this
affects the balances of domestic demand and supply
for tradeable and non-tradeable goods. However,
I suggest the general proposition that the risk of
running into such problems rises quite sharply if
large, discontinuous increases in external assistance
occur.
The second macro problem refers to the
notorious unpredictability of aid inflows and the
acute problems that this can create for
macroeconomic management. The large
uncertainties are well demonstrated in a research
paper by InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) staff
members (Bulir and Hamann 2001), which
investigates the volatility and predictability of aid
in general and of programme versus project aid.
Among their remarkable results are the following:
● Aid is more volatile thandomestic fiscal revenues
and tends to be pro-cyclical.
● Fiscal planners are highly uncertain of aid
receipts and ‘the information content of
commitments made by donors is either very
small or statistically insignificant’.
● There are much larger prediction errors in
programme aid than with project assistance and
a stronger tendency towards overestimation.
This is partly because of the application of
conditionality, but there are other reasons too.
The point to make here, of course, is that the
larger the aid inflows, and the more of it which
flows through the budget, the larger will be the
macro dangers. Under the Rome Declaration,
donors have pledged that they will work to raise
predictability, as well as to channel more of their
assistance through recipient budgets. But we should
not underestimate the difficulties of achieving
greater predictability, given the far greater association
of direct budgetary support with political as well
as economic policy conditionality and the special
vulnerability of this form to political “interference”
fromMinisters ofDevelopment Co-operation. For
example, in Rwanda, despite good performance by
the government, budgetary support in 2004 was
seriously disrupted by the ad hoc application by
two major donors of previously unstated political
conditionalities, in ways clearly contrary to written
understandings.
5 Political accountability and
moral hazard
At the heart of the argument of this article, is a belief
that the fundamental causes of the economic and
social malaise in many African countries are
domestic in nature and, in particular, are intimately
linked to the anti-developmental and weakly
accountable nature of many African political
systems. This implies a rejection of PrimeMinister
Blair’s description of Africa’s situation as ‘a scar on
the conscience of the world’. To the extent that the
problems are viewed as essentially African, it follows
that providing more aid does not address the root
causes of persistent poverty and is thus likely to
end in tears. In this connection, the work
undertaken under DFID’s “drivers of change”
initiative is of particular interest, for this was a
response to the situation where a donor finds it
cannot achieve its aspirations because it cannot get
to grips with what actually makes things tick in
recipient countries. So far as African countries are
concerned, “drivers of change” studies have
overwhelmingly pointed to the fundamental
difficulties generated by patronage-based, or neo-
patrimonial, political systems.
If this were not bad enough, there is the real
danger that a lot more aid will worsen the
weaknesses attributable to political systems. To a
large extent, this danger can be summed up under
the heading of “moral hazard” – the risk that Africa’s
politicians will be made less ready to tackle their
countries’ problems when they can see they can
coast along on the basis of aid. This refers to
decisions about the adoption of potentially
unpopular policy reforms and also to the temptation
to use aid as a substitute for domestic taxation. As
Mick Moore (1998) has been warning, growing
reliance on aid inflows makes governments highly
sensitive to the views of the donors, as against their
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own taxpayers.And governments’ ability to tap aid
sources reduces their need to tax their electorates,
not only weakening their need to listen to the
population, but sapping the incentive for taxpayers
to organise to make their voices heard. If a very
high proportion of a government’s total resources
are coming from aid rather than taxation, this will
inevitably skew accountability away from being
answerable to the local electorate in favour of trying
to appear to meet the strident claims of
“development partners” and their multiple
conditionalities. This is not a pattern which
contributes much to the development of more
responsive, less patronage-based political systems.
Substantial future aid inflows wouldmost likely
aggravate these negative effects.Of course, donors
will assure us that they would erect safeguards
against such dangers, but reasons will be given later
for doubting such assurances.
6 Undermining aid effectiveness
It was suggested earlier that the allure of a lot more
aid for Africa puts us in danger of forgetting some
of the lessons that we thought we had learned about
the limitations of what aid can achieve. The focus
of the aid literature and of attempts to reform aid
practices over the last 15–20 years has been on
raising its effectiveness, in recognition that much
past assistance had been ineffectual. One of the
more disconcerting things about the current state
of the aid discussion, at least within theUK, is that
claims that we can double aid to Africa and at the
same time continue to improve on aid quality seem
to go unchallenged. That they are complementary
in this way seems a dubious proposition.
First, there is an awkward question of numbers.
The (Sachs)Millennium Project, for example, wants
to single out at least adozen countries for “fast track”
treatment – countries with proven records of good
governance and absorptive capacity.However, one
must ask, is there a dozen countries, among those
viewed as requiring aid, whichmeet these criteria?
Everyone mentions Mozambique, Tanzania and
Uganda. I would add Rwanda and no doubt there
are others, but one fairly quickly begins to run out
of obvious candidates. It is a spectrum, of course,
but the “good” end of the spectrum is not very
crowded. Moreover, none of the favourites is
particularly big, so that their ability to absorb really
large amounts of new money is inevitably limited.
The big ones – Nigeria, the Democratic Republic
of theCongo, Angola – which potentially could use
big money, are at various points towards the “bad”
end of the spectrum. So where is all this extramoney
to be used? The dangers must be that the “good
guys” get swamped – with all the downsides
rehearsed above – but that a lot of the “not-very-
good guys” get a lot more too, with all that would
mean for the effectiveness of the assistance provided,
especially in terms of its ability to improve the well-
being of poor people.
What is hinted at in the last paragraph, as would
surely be the case, is that if the donor community
responds to theUK’s attempts to raise the quantum
of aid, an intensification of inter-donor competition
would ensue and the staffs of donor agencies would
come under the most intense pressures to spend
their budgets. There is nothing more detrimental to
aid effectiveness than pressures to spend.Many of the
ingredients of the aid effectiveness agenda would
be put at risk: improved coordination, as a result
of inter-donor competition; the sacrifice of quality
for quantity, as the necessity to keep the money
moving pushes professional advice and cool
evaluation into the background and leads to an
increased politicisation of aid allocation decisions;
an erosion of country selectivity and an attempt to
substitute for this by an illusory plethora of policy
conditions which will not be kept or sustained.
One of the ways this is likely to manifest itself
is the pushing ofmajor amounts of direct budgetary
support into fiscal systems that fail to provide even
rudimentary assurance that the extra money will
be used in ways that donors – and we as taxpayers
– would wish. Another is the devotion of more aid
resources to debt relief, because it is an easy way
of spendingmoney quickly.Debt relief has its strong
points as an aid modality, but it has some strong
negatives too. Here are just two:
1. There is a well-established negative association
at the country level between experiencing debt
servicing difficulties and the past quality of their
policies: debt-distressed countries have generally
pursued poor policies (Easterly 2001). So, using
debt distress as a criterion for distributing aid
resources turns out to be a way of distributing
it to countries unlikely to put it to good use – a
particularly adverse formofmoral hazard, with
those who havemanaged their economies so as
to avoid running into debt difficulties being
penalised.
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2. Indebtedness is a poor guide to need, if by need
wemean the extent of poverty within countries.
It has been shown that only amodest proportion
of the world’s poor live in debt-distressed
countries (Ranis and Stewart 2001).
7 Aid as an easy option
Finally, there is the danger, notwithstanding good
intentions to the contrary, that an increase in aid
volumes for Africa will be taken by European and
other rich-country governments as an easy option
– to their budgets, aid is small change, after all –
by comparison withmuch tougher decisions about
reducingOrganisation for Economic Co-operation
andDevelopment  (OECD) agricultural protection,
revamping tariff structures so as not to discriminate
against in-country processing of Africa’s primary
products, anddoing somethingmore effective about
man-made environmental threats, which only add
to the difficulties faced by African countries. I realise
that the UK government is trying to avoid a bias
against these tougher decisions, but there must be
a real danger that it will not succeed.
8 Conclusion: tapping the
momentum
Themomentum that has been generated by recent
campaigning is a positive factor that should be
tapped – but for a more sensible agenda. Here is
this author’s agenda:
● Be generous, provide more aid, when this will
not undermine national ownership,
accountability and effectiveness.TheMillennium
Project has suggested a number of “quick win”
steps.Not all of these are equally promising, but
the mass distribution of anti-malarial bed-nets
is particularly attractive, in not requiring an
elaborate institutional infrastructure. There is
surely also much scope for much increased
provision of antiretroviralHIV/AIDS treatments.
We should look for such opportunities. It is no
part of my intention to take an anti-aid stance.
● Be less exclusively preoccupied with the
distorting pursuit of the MDGs and poverty
reduction. Redress the extreme swing that has
occurred away frompromoting the development
of directly productive sectors.
● Put Africans in the driving seat, let the pace of
aid increases be set by their ownprogress towards
accountability, equity and soundmanagement,
and find non-intrusive ways of supporting those
who demonstrate that they wish tomove in these
directions.
● Hit hard on aid quality issues, and on trade and
related aspects of the global environment, which
hold Africa back.
● Do not forget that huge numbers of poor people
are not African.Avoid an unbalanced, politically
driven concentration onAfrica to the detriment
of other developing countries.
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Note
1. I will throughout be using “Africa” to refer to sub-Saharan
Africa.
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